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1
See ARCHIMEDES, ON THE SPHERE AND CYLINDER bk. 1, at 3 (Thomas L. Heath ed., trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1897) (c. 225 B.C.E.); see also THOMAS L. HEATH, ARCHIMEDES 36
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1920).
2
Rube Goldberg was a cartoonist who drew overly complex machines intended to perform a simple task. See David Olsen & Mark J. Nelson, The Narrative Logic of Rube Goldberg
Machines, 10 INT’L CONF. ON INTERACTIVE DIGI. STORYTELLING (Nov. 14–17, 2017), in 10690
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Almost two millennia ago, Archimedes explained that the shortest distance
between two points is a straight line.1 That fundamental principle has been lost
in the strange, meandering design of the nation’s pharmaceutical supply system.
The result, as Archimedes would have predicted, is disastrous for the system’s
efficiency—not to mention for patients, payors, and taxpayers alike.
Rather than a straight line, the flow of products and payments for prescription
drugs more closely resembles a Rube Goldberg machine,2 in which payment
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flows in multiple directions, product flows in different directions, and all of it
looks like the pathway of a drunken sailor, dropping money from his pocket
along the way.
Figure 1: Pharmaceutical Supply Chain3
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LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 104 (Nuno Nunes, Ian Oakley &Valentina Nisi eds.,
2017).
3
Neeraj Sood, Tiffany Shih, Karen Van Nuys & Dana Goldman, Follow the Money: The
Flow of Funds in the Pharmaceutical Distribution System, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 13,
2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170613.060557/full/
[https://perma.cc/DA48-3SBR].
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Systems emerge for a reason. Some develop in response to genuine economic
efficiencies. Some blossom in response to legal or regulatory imperatives. Others emerge for more perverse reasons, when incentives within the system encourage distortions—deviations in the pathway so that a clever participant can
amble over and pluck a tasty morsel from a neighboring field. Each of these has
played a role, at various times, in the development of the pharmaceutical system.
With a structure as entrenched and complex as this, a key question emerges:
Is it possible to reorder the system once it has ossified into place? This article
contemplates disrupting the pathways that have grown up across time—that is,
designing disruption for pharmaceuticals. If one could design a system with a
much more direct and coherent path from those who manufacture prescription
medicine to the patients who take them, what would that pathway look like, and
what key barriers would need to be moved out of the way, either practical, legislative, or regulatory? Part I of this article describes the twisted drug supply
chain in the United States. Part II presents a snapshot of profits and prices in the
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pharmaceutical industry. Part III describes the dynamics of pricing for medicine,
particularly explaining the ways in which buy-side constraints that limit price in
more typical markets are dampened in the healthcare market. Part IV traces the
historic development of the various players and distortions in the pharmaceutical
market, describing the context of their emergence and the interests served. Part
V sets out a proposal that individual states—as the laboratories of democracy—
could pilot to bypass many of the contortions that are strangling the industry.
This section also describes the legal changes that would be needed to allow such
initiatives to flourish, including changes that could be accomplished through expansion of existing legal doctrine or passage of new legislation.
I. TODAY’S SUPPLY CHAIN
The path a prescription drug takes from the drug company to a patient’s medicine cabinet is labyrinthine, to say the least, populated with a host of intermediaries throughout. To give readers a glimpse into the topic, the introduction to
this article presented a graphic of the drug supply chain. The current section uses
an additional graphic, which includes even more players and complexities. As
this second graphic—displayed below—demonstrates, the process of transmitting a drug from its manufacturer to its user supports an ecosystem of different
players, many of whom—such as wholesale distributors and rebate aggregators—largely escape notoriety.4

02/22/2022 11:40:34
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4
For instance, three of the six largest healthcare companies (by 2020 revenue) are wholesale distributors. See Eric Oliver, 10 Biggest Healthcare Companies by Revenue, BECKER’S
ASC REV. (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.beckersasc.com/benchmarking/10-biggest-healthcarecompanies-by-revenue.html [https://perma.cc/BRD4-D3PT] (noting that wholesale distributors McKesson, AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health rank third, fourth, and sixth, respectively).
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Figure 2: Pharmaceutical Intermediaries5

In highly simplified form, the disjointed journey of a prescription drug6 begins at the drug company’s manufacturing facility, where the drug is produced.

5
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Diagram courtesy of Marilyn Bartlett. It is worth emphasizing that this chart describes
the flow of prescription drugs through pharmacies, not hospitals. The hospital pharmaceutical
supply chain has its own kinks, including the 340B Drug Pricing Program, which secures
protected drug costs (based on average manufacturer costs, before mark-ups from wholesalers
and pharmacies) for low-income “safety net hospitals.” See 340B HEALTH, Overview of the
340B Drug Pricing Program, https://www.340bhealth.org/members/340b-program/overview/ [https://perma.cc/6XSE-TDBL]. The Supreme Court will consider a challenge to
Trump-era reductions to the reimbursements government pays to safety net hospitals for such
discount drug purchases made under the 340B Program later this term. See Rachel Cohrs,
Supreme Court to Take Up Hospitals’ Challenge to Medicare Pay Cuts, STAT NEWS (July 2,
2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/02/supreme-court-hospitals-challenge-to-medicare-drug-pay-cuts/?utm_source=STAT+Newsletters&utm_campaign=bc5adacc25dc_diagnosis_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8cab1d7961-bc5adacc25152947498 [https://perma.cc/AJJ8-U6NA]. In addition to 340B, hospitals across the board
demonstrate more irregular pricing than the supply chain for retail pharmacies overall. Indeed,
with the HHS requirement that hospitals post their drug costs, data collected from those hospitals in compliance indicates a remarkable pricing disparity. See Aaron Gal, Lance Wilkes,
Lee Hambright, Amy Xiong, Betty Huang, Sally Fernandes, Ben Weissman & John Rogers,
ALLIANCE BERNSTEIN, U.S. Healthcare: As Hospitals Are Forced to Release Real Prices, We
Learn Their Drug Markups Average 250%; Will Dynamics Change?, BERNSTEIN RSCH. REP.:
U.S. BIOPHARM., Jan. 15, 2021, at 7.
6
This graphic visualizes the journey of branded prescription drugs, which, unlike generic
drugs, tend to elicit rebates from brand drug companies via Pharmacy Benefit Managers
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The manufacturing process may itself be fragmented across multiple parties. For
instance, a significant portion of drug manufacturing by American firms is outsourced overseas.7 Contract manufacturing organizations (CMOs) are also increasingly used in various stages of drug production, so much so that one industry report estimates that only one-third of drug manufacturing occurs in-house.8
From the manufacturer, the product may be routed through a warehouse before acquisition by a wholesale distributor. Drugs may again be outsourced for
repackaging9 or relabeling.10 Many manufacturers also rely on external advertising or marketing agencies to direct the promotion of their drugs to consumers.11

02/22/2022 11:40:34
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(PBMs) to health plans. Generic drug supply chains are similar from a supply standpoint,
although they lack some of the payment middlemen that handle brand drug rebates, for instance. Moreover, payment flows are also weighted differently. For example, wholesalers and
pharmacies capture a significantly greater portion of revenue from generic—as opposed to
branded—drugs. See Sood, supra note 3.
7
See generally Lisa Walkush, Yvette Jansen, Ashley Johnson & Corine Whitttick, The
Growing Benefits to Reshoring Pharma Operations, PHARMA MFG. (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www.pharmamanufacturing.com/articles/2020/the-growing-benefits-to-reshoringpharma-operations/ [https://perma.cc/C64C-BUYC].
8
See DATEX CORP., Warehouse Basics: What Is Pharmaceutical Contract Manufacturing?,
https://www.datexcorp.com/what-is-pharmaceutical-contract-manufacturing/
[https://perma.cc/AA8D-YTZ6]. Also relevant are licensing agreements between two or more
drug companies to distribute or market a drug in foreign markets. See, e.g., Rahul Khetan,
Biopharma Licensing and M&A Trends in the 21st-Century Landscape, 25 J. COMM.
BIOTECH. 37, 39 (2020).
9
Medication may be repackaged to help patients stay on a dosage schedule or deliver a
specific quantity of medication. See PROFICIENTRX, What Is Repackaging Medication?, (Oct.
14, 2020), https://proficientrx.com/repackaging-medication-how/ [https://perma.cc/8VC9CKY2].
10
Drugs manufactured abroad may be re-labeled upon importation to comply with U.S.
regulations and standards. See Importation of Prescription Drugs, 85 Fed. Reg. 62,094, 62,095
(Nov. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 251).
11
The aggressive marketing of prescription drugs directly to consumers—a practice allowed only in the United States and New Zealand—can be traced back decades to medical
advertising agencies led by the likes of Arthur Sackler (of Oxycontin infamy). For a history
of the Sackler family and their contributions to modern medical marketing, see generally
GERALD POSNER, PHARMA: GREED, LIES AND THE POISONING OF AMERICA (2020) [hereinafter
POSNER]; see also Aiken, infra note 73 (describing how direct-to-consumer advertising induces unnecessary or additional prescriptions); cf. Robin Feldman, Physicians Treating Alzheimer’s Disease Patients Should Be Aware That Televised Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
Links More Strongly to Drug Utilization in Older Patients, 81 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 1169,
1174 (2021) (finding that advertising spending for high-spending drugs is associated with
increased drug utilization).
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Wholesale distributors sell and ship prescription drugs to pharmacies,12 many
of which are large, consolidated chains with significant purchasing power.13 In
contrast, independent pharmacies can benefit from “group purchasing organizations” allowing many smaller outlets to band together for securing better deals
from wholesalers,14 often by contracting in bulk.15 Only after a drug reaches a
pharmacy is it then dispensed to patients.
If it takes a village to move a prescription drug from the assembly line to the
pharmacy counter, the corresponding flow of payments from patient back to
drug company is no less involved. In return for filling a prescription at the pharmacy, an insured patient, instead of directly compensating the pharmacy, usually
pays a co-pay or co-insurance amount to the pharmacist, an amount that is determined by the plan’s formularies. Unless the patient purchases the same medication regularly, the patient most likely will not know what the prescription will
cost until the purchase is rung up at the cash register. The health plan foots the
remaining bill, and the resulting transaction, known as a claim, is processed by
intermediaries called Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).16 The health plan

02/22/2022 11:40:34
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12
As with the purchases they make from drug companies, wholesalers (as the name suggests) tend to sell large quantities of drugs at once, an arrangement that favors consolidated
pharmacy chains. See Russ Britt, Growing Share of ‘Big Three’ Gets Federal Attention,
MARKETWATCH (May 30, 2007), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/growing-share-of-bigthree-drug-wholesalers-gets-attention [https://perma.cc/6ULC-8PXZ]. Although the supply
chain is disintegrated, vertical partnerships between pharmacies and wholesalers may create
a more integrated pipeline. See Adam J. Fein, The Big Three Wholesalers: Revenues and
Channel Share Up, Profits Down, DRUG CHANNELS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.drugchannels.net/2019/10/the-big-three-wholesalers-revenues-and.html
[https://perma.cc/QK347Q7E] [hereinafter Fein, Wholesalers] (attributing increase in wholesaler AmerisourceBergen’s market share to partnerships with Express Scripts and Walgreens Boots Alliance, a major PBM and pharmacy chain, respectively).
13
See Adam J. Fein, The Top 15 U.S. Pharmacies of 2020: Market Shares and Revenues
at the Biggest Companies, DRUG CHANNELS (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.drugchannels.net/2021/03/the-top-15-us-pharmacies-of-2020-market.html [https://perma.cc/D8GB4GBN] [hereinafter Fein, Pharmacies] (noting that three largest pharmacies held more than
50% of U.S. market in 2020).
14
See TERRY HISEY, MATT HEIM, ROB JACOBY & JEREMY MANCKE, DELOITTE, THE ROLE
OF DISTRIBUTORS IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 7 (2019). GPOs are also important for
smaller hospitals and medical clinics acquiring prescription drugs. See Todd Ebert, Healthcare
Supply Chain Assoc., U.S. Federal Trade Commission Workshop Presentation Slides: Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Entry and Supply Chain Dynamics 136
(Nov. 8, 2017) (available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1255653/understanding_competition_in_prescription_drug_markets_workshop_slides_11-8-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/WLW2-WEC3]) [hereinafter FTC Workshop
Slides].
15
See Britt, supra note 12.
16
See generally Laura Entis, Why Does Medicine Cost So Much? Here’s How Drug Prices
Are Set, TIME (Apr. 9, 2019), https://time.com/5564547/drug-prices-medicine/
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pays the PBM not only to process claims and serve as the intermediary with the
pharmacy, but also to design its formularies17 and negotiate rebates from drug
companies. The PBM retains a negotiated portion of these drug company rebates, passing through the remaining percentage to health plans.18 These rebates,
which will cover purchases by large numbers of patients and possibly of multiple
drugs, are paid out long after the patient has made the purchase.
Rebates, although touted as a cost-savings measure,19 confuse the flow of payments considerably. Paid back to health plans in the form of a lump sum, rebates
camouflage the price a health plan ultimately pays for a single prescription.20 To

02/22/2022 11:40:34
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[https://perma.cc/T4K3-UKCC]; see also Sood, supra note 3. The co-pay or co-insurance
amount can vary considerably depending on the plan and the patient’s status within the plan.
For example, Medicare Part D has four stages of coverage in any given year. These range
from full coverage to the “donut hole” period. During the “donut hole” period, the patient
must pay 25% of all drug costs. Price-sensitivity of patients may be greater during the “donut
hole” period than during the “catastrophic coverage” period, when the patient’s contribution
is lower. See The Four Coverage Stages of Medicare’s Part D Program, BLUE MEDICARERX
(Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.rxmedicareplans.com/Learn/Stages [https://perma.cc/A3DELJCE].
17
Many health plans utilize a formulary as a cost-saving method of organizing the drugs
they cover, placing expensive drugs on higher tiers (with a higher co-pay) and cheaper drugs
on lower, more accessible tiers. A properly designed formulary should incentivize patients to
choose cheaper, generic options when available, because they will be found on lower tiers,
with lower co-pays. But see Robin Feldman, The Devil in the Tiers, 8 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1,
19 (2021) [hereinafter Feldman, Devil] (analysis of Medicare claims between 2010 and 2017
found that drugs are increasingly “mis-tiered”, with 74% of drugs placed on inappropriate
tiers).
18
See Response Letter from Eric R. Slusser, Exec. Vice President/CFO, Express Scripts,
to Sec. Exch. Comm’n (June 26, 2017) (on file with author) (noting that some clients prefer
to keep greater percentage of rebates); see also ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY AND SECRET
HANDSHAKES 30–31 (2019) [hereinafter HANDSHAKES] (noting that PBMs may respond to
mandatory rebate pass-throughs by simply shifting rebate dollars to inflation payments or
administrative fees they also receive from brand drug companies). Similarly, some insurers
have promised to begin passing drug company rebates through to patients, but such an initiative may be toothless if premiums or co-pays become simultaneously more expensive. See
Entis, supra note 16.
19
As drug companies are eager to point out, rebates are not the only means of reducing
list prices. Manufacturer coupons and co-pay assistance are paid out to patients by drug companies or their affiliated charities. This outlay does not reflect an unexpected altruism from
drug companies and can instead be understood as another payment stream in the complex
pharmaceutical web—issuing coupons helps retain a larger user base (whose health plans still
pay their full cost allotment) and contributions made through a charitable organization are
tax-deductible. See generally SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44264,
PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISCOUNT COUPONS AND PATIENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (PAPS)
(2017).
20
Maintaining the opacity of drug prices enables PBMs to capture a greater share of revenue, sometimes resulting in higher drug prices. See generally Robin Feldman, Perverse
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further complicate matters, although drug companies may issue rebates directly
to PBMs, these payments may first be collected by rebate aggregators before
reaching the PBM.21 Rebate aggregators, however, may be affiliated with the
PBMs to which they pay out the rebates compiled from drug companies; this
arrangement enables the PBM to capture a greater cut of drug company rebates,
in turn passing fewer rebates through to health plans.22
Still other intermediaries can pose between drug companies and patients, further diverting and re-allocating payment flows. Just as group purchasing organizations help independent pharmacies secure drug supply from wholesalers,
pharmacy services administration organizations (PSAOs) act as umbrella groups
for many smaller, independent pharmacies, collectively leveraging their market
share to negotiate contracts with PBMs and health plans.23 Similarly, pharmacy
brokers can connect health plans with PBMs, especially in the case of smaller,
self-insured employers.24 Third-party administrators may also act as liaisons between health plans and PBMs, helping to design formularies in line with the
specifications of a health plan.25 Finally, auditors may examine contracts between PBMs and other actors—such as health plans and pharmacies—creating

02/22/2022 11:40:34
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Incentives: Why Everyone Prefers Higher Drug Prices—Except for Those Who Pay the Bills,
57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303 (2020) [hereinafter Feldman, Perverse Incentives]. PBMs do not
just passively benefit from the secrecy of rebate and net price amounts; rather, they spuriously
assert that their contracts with drug companies constitute trade secrets. See Robin Feldman &
Charles Tait Graves, Naked Price & Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach, 22 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 61, 63–80 (2020).
21
See Rose McNulty, In Drug Pricing, PBMs Called the “Arsonist and Firefighter in
One”, 26 EVIDENCE-BASED ONCOLOGY 315, 315 (2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/indrug-pricing-pbms-called-the-arsonist-and-the-firefighter-in-one- [https://perma.cc/X9AQP3T8] (noting that PBMs sometimes contract rebate aggregator to collect from drug companies on their behalf).
22
See id. (observing that rebate aggregator affiliated with PBMs can help PBMs circumvent contractual requirement to pass rebates through to health plan by retaining some percentage of rebates that aggregator collects and delivers to PBMs and that health plans may be
unaware that rebate aggregators are affiliated with or owned by PBMs that use them).
23
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-176, PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS: THE NUMBER, ROLE, AND OWNERSHIP OF PHARMACY SERVICES ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATIONS (2013) [hereinafter GAO PSAO REPORT]; HISEY, supra note 14, at 7.
24
See Bob Meyer, Getting the Most Out of a Prescription Benefit Plan, BROKER WORLD
MAG. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://brokerworldmag.com/getting-the-most-out-of-a-prescriptionbenefit-plan/ [https://perma.cc/9R4V-RVGR]. There are, however, generally few PBM options from which a health plan may select, with three firms controlling more than 85% of the
market—a fact that has already attracted legislative attention. See Drug Pricing in America:
A Prescription for Change, Part III: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 240
(2019); see also HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 14.
25
See Kev Coleman, What is a Third-Party Administrator (TPA)?, ASS’N HEALTH PLANS
(Nov.
18,
2020),
https://www.associationhealthplans.com/group-health/what-istpa/#:~:text=TPAs%20help%20with%20the%20design,participate%20in%20its%20ongoing%20administration [https://perma.cc/ZM6Y-GDB6].
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yet another niche in the drug supply ecosystem.26 Audits may be performed in
both directions: health plans can audit their PBM contracts,27 and PBMs may
audit pharmacy claims to ensure that pharmacies are not falsifying claims or
over-dispensing medications.28
Although the intermediaries of the pharmaceutical ecosystem seem to crowd
a large room, the same organizations may in fact fill many of its niches. Cardinal
Health, for example, commands more than a quarter of the wholesale distribution market,29 but also operates in practically every other node of the supply
chain. Cardinal—the sixth-largest healthcare company in the world30 —advertises services ranging from contract manufacturing31 to group purchasing32 and
from pharmacy services administration organizations33 to pharmacy

26

02/22/2022 11:40:34
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See, e.g., PILLARRX, 4 Financial Benefits to Having a PBM Audit, https://pillarrx.com/4financial-benefits-to-pbm-audit/ [https://perma.cc/P6WL-S4XX].
27
See, e.g., The Health Plan’s Guide to Auditing your Pharmacy Benefit Manager Contract from A to Z, THE BURCHFIELD GRP. 21–22 (2017), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/139847/BFG-Health_Care_Guide-052317.pdf?t=1502895470217
[https://perma.cc/6Q5U-Q4HP]. But see Feldman & Graves, supra note 20, at 72 (noting that
health plan auditors may be precluded from analyzing details of PBM contracts with brand
drug companies on basis of trade secrecy claims).
28
Cf. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $269.2 Million Recovery from Walgreens in Two Civil Healthcare Fraud Settlements
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces2692-million-recovery-walgreens-two-civilhealthcare#:~:text=Crotty%20and%20unsealed%20today%2C%20requires,who%20did%20not%20need%20them
[https://perma.cc/68PW-78G4 ] (reporting $200 million settlement following allegations that
Walgreens over-dispensed insulin pens to Medicaid patients).
29
As of 2018, Cardinal wholesale revenue exceeded $100 billion annually. See Fein,
Wholesalers, supra note 12.
30
Oliver, supra note 4.
31
Contract Manufacturing & Pharmacy Solutions, CARDINAL HEALTH, https://www.cardinalhealth.com/en/services/manufacturer/contract-manufacturing-organization.html
[https://perma.cc/3XMF-C327 ] (displaying specific advertisement of radiopharmaceuticals,
a targeted therapy with radioactive molecules increasingly used in oncology); see Radiopharmaceuticals: Radiation Therapy Enters the Modern Age, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.cancer.gov/news-events/cancer-currents-blog/2020/radiopharmaceuticals-cancer-radiation-therapy [https://perma.cc/8XT3-4SWV].
32
Group Purchasing Organizations, CARDINAL HEALTH, https://www.cardinalhealth.com/en/services/specialty-physician-practice/our-gpos.html
[https://perma.cc/UCJ7-27JJ].
33
Pharmacy Services Administration Organization (PSAO), CARDINAL HEALTH,
https://www.cardinalhealth.com/en/services/retail-pharmacy/managing-care/psao-services.html [https://perma.cc/7XHE-NQJM. Nine of the twenty-two PSAOs identified in a
government report were owned by wholesaler. The “Big Three” wholesalers—Cardinal, AmerisourceBergen, and McKesson—own three of the five largest PSAOs. See GAO PSAO
REPORT, supra note 23, at 25.
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management.34 Consequently, a company like Cardinal has a chance to profit
from nearly every transaction involved in moving a drug from manufacturer to
patient.35 Cardinal, predictably, is not the only player to switch uniforms: CVS
Health includes CVS, one of the largest retail pharmacy chains, Caremark, one
of the “Big Three” PBMs, and Aetna, a major health insurer36—a fact that has
raised conflict of interest concerns.37 Although at first glance the supply chain is
remarkably disaggregated, with distinct intermediaries for each task, the same
consolidated actors often don many hats.
Parsing the functions of various agents is not the only challenge posed by the
pharmaceutical supply chain. The price attached to a prescription drug shifts at
each stop on this winding road, generating a tongue-twisting series of acronyms
that mirrors the convolution of the supply chain itself. When a wholesaler purchases a drug directly from the manufacturer, it pays a wholesale acquisition
cost (WAC),38 which, by the statutory definition, does not include any rebates
or discounts.39 In contrast, the average manufacturer price (AMP)—what wholesalers pay manufacturers for a drug—is derived from sales transactions, including discounts in the price wholesalers pay manufacturers; to participate in Medicaid, drug companies must report AMPs to the Center for Medicaid & Medicare
Services quarterly.40

02/22/2022 11:40:34
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34
Ordering and Inventory, CARDINAL HEALTH, https://www.cardinalhealth.com/en/services/retail-pharmacy/ordering-and-inventory.html [https://perma.cc/LRQ3-EPMP.
35
For more on the various stakeholders that benefit from this tangled supply chain, see
infra Section IV.
36
See Stacy Mitchell & Zach Freed, How the FTC Protected the Market Power of Pharmacy Benefit Managers, PROMARKET (Feb. 19, 2021), https://promarket.org/2021/02/19/ftcmarket-power-pharmacy-benefit-managers/ [https://perma.cc/EQL3-AGKA] (describing
how the FTC enabled remarkable vertical consolidation in healthcare sector in addition to
horizontal mergers, exemplified by the Caremark-CVS-Aetna triumvirate).
37
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 47–48 & 148 n.19; Mark J. Botti, C. Fairley Spillman
& Diana L. Gillis, FTC Closes Antitrust and Unfair Competition Investigation of CVS Caremark Post-merger Marketing Practices, AKIN GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD, LLP (Jan. 19,
2012), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/ftc-closes-antitrust-and-unfair-competition-investigation-of-cvs-caremark-post-merger.html [https://perma.cc/82QA-2RDM]
(noting that FTC investigated CVS-Caremark merger but found no antitrust wrongdoing).
38
For a primer on the alphabet soup of drug pricing acronyms, see generally Joey Mattingly, Understanding Drug Pricing, U.S. PHARMACIST (June 20, 2012), https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/understanding-drug-pricing [https://perma.cc/2LWS-MN3D].
39
See 42 U.S.C. 1396r–8(k)(5) (2021). WAC is not based on actual sales data, limiting
its utility as a policy tool. See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., OEI-05-05-00240, MEDICAID DRUG PRICE COMPARISONS: AVERAGE MANUFACTURED
PRICE TO PUBLISHED PRICES i (2005) [hereinafter HHS OIG REPORT].
40
HHS OIG REPORT, supra note 39. Average manufacturer price is the touchstone for
some federal initiatives, such as the 340B program. See 340B HEALTH, supra note 5.
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At the next stage, average wholesale price (AWP) measures what retail pharmacies pay to acquire drugs from wholesalers.41 Like the WAC, AWP does not
reflect discounts, leading some to dub it as shorthand for “Ain’t What’s Paid.”42
Rather than drawing from actual sales data, AWP is based on pricing information that drug companies provide to third-party databases.43 Commonly referred to as a drug’s “list price”, the AWP is significantly higher than AMP.44
The inflation of AWP matters because most states use it to calculate Medicaid
reimbursement.45
Crucially, however, not one of these acronyms describes what a drug eventually costs from the pharmacy.46 Although the out-of-pocket amount a patient
pays to dispense a drug (in the form of a co-pay or co-insurance) may be discernible (at least to the patient), far more elusive is the “net price” that the health
plan pays the drug company via a PBM.47 With the identity of a prescription
drug’s price changing from node to node, the supply chain functions ultimately
as a cipher, confusing rather than clarifying what a drug costs.
II. A SNAPSHOT OF PRICES & PROFITS
The system certainly has not proven a boon for society. The pharmaceutical
industry today is beset by a staggering growth in prescription drug prices. In the
United States—where some brand-name drugs cost more than triple what they
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41
Dawn M. Gencarelli, One Pill, Many Prices: Variation in Prescription Drug Prices in
Selected Government Programs, in NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM ISSUE BRIEF NO. 807 1, 3
(2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK561171 [https://perma.cc/3X5E-KJ7P];
see generally Mattingly, supra note 38.
42
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 12.
43
Id.; Gencarelli, supra note 41.
44
See HHS OIG REPORT, supra note 39, at 11 (stating that AMP is an average of 70%
lower than AWP for generic drugs and 23% lower for brands).
45
See id. at 11–12 (noting that to determine reimbursement amounts, forty-nine states use
estimated acquisition cost (EAC), which reduces AWP by a percentage generally larger for
generic drugs).
46
Another measure—the usual & customary price (U&C)—expresses the cash or retail
cost of a drug at the pharmacy but excludes the rebates and discounts from which insured
patients benefit. In theory, a drug’s U&C cost should be higher than its AWP, on account of
the pharmacy taking its cut. See generally Mattingly, supra note 38; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-306R, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: TRENDS IN USUAL &
CUSTOMARY PRICES FOR COMMONLY-USED DRUGS 8 (2011) (finding that U&C prices rose
faster than AMPs & AWPs for same basket of drugs between 2006 and 2010).
47
See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 13–14 (explaining when health plans receive a rebate check from PBMs, amount reflects many transactions over course of quarter or year,
rendering per-unit cost of single prescription inscrutable); see also Feldman & Graves, supra
note 20, at 72 (discussing how opacity of net prices is upheld by trade secrecy claims, mutual
interest of drug companies, and PBMs to maintain secret net prices).
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do in other countries48—the average price of brand-name drugs increased 313%
between 2010 and 2017.49 Even commercially insured patients are now saddled
with higher out-of-pocket drug costs compared to previous years, 50 a plight that
the uninsured suffer more acutely still.51 As a result, many who depend on lifesaving medication regularly skip or ration their dosages,52 making access to
medicine a serious national concern.
Industry intermediaries, by contrast, have enjoyed healthy revenue growth
during this period. PBM revenue grew nearly 50% between 2014 and 2016
alone, fueled by an increase in administrative fees.53 Moreover, a lack of transparency means that PBMs’ profit margins may be significantly understated.54 At

48
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See Andrew W. Mulcahy, Prescription Drug Prices in the United States Are 2.56 Times
Those
in
Other
Countries,
RAND
CORP.
(Jan.
28,
2021),
https://www.rand.org/news/press/2021/01/28.html [https://perma.cc/Z8KK-EJRM] (finding
that price of “brand-name originator drugs” in U.S. was 344% of thirty-two OECD countries’
average price in 2018).
49
Feldman, Devil, supra note 17, at 1 (examining Medicare claims for cohort of roughly
one million patients from 2010 to 2017 and measuring prices of brand name drugs after accounting for rebates).
50
See Nathan E. Wineinger, Yunyue Zhang & Eric J. Topol, Trends in Prices of Popular
Brand-Name Prescription Drugs in the United States, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (May 31,
2019),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2734804
[https://perma.cc/SX3C-XJ6A] (stating that 78% of top-selling drugs have carried 50% or
greater increase in insurer and out-of-pocket costs since 2012).
51
List price increases especially impact uninsured patients, who do not benefit from rebates paid out to insurers. Such prices reliably rise several percentage points each year. See
Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neumann, Price Increases Continue to Outpace Inflation for Many
Medicare Part D Drugs, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/price-increases-continue-to-outpace-inflation-for-many-medicare-part-ddrugs/#:~:text=Among%20the%20drugs%20with%20list,times%20the%20rate%20of%20in
flation [https://perma.cc/FY8J-P2SH] (noting that between 2018 and 2019, median list prices
rose 6.5%, with many drugs’ price gains exceeding 10%).
52
See, e.g., H.B. 19-1216, 73rd Gen. Assemb. 2 (Colo. 2019) (observing that 40% of Coloradans using insulin reported having to skip or ration doses at least once a year).
53
Robert Zirkelbach, The PBM Story You Haven’t Heard: Hidden Fees Quadrupled in
Two Years, PHRMA (Mar. 20, 2019), https://catalyst.phrma.org/the-pbm-story-you-haventheard-hidden-fees-quadrupled-in-two-years [https://perma.cc/P66D-G4GR] (noting that
PBM industry revenue increased from approximately $15 billion in 2014 to more than $22
billion in 2016, with “hidden” administrative and service fees charged to drug companies
nearly quadrupling).
54
PBMs neglect to include the transactional fees they earn from passing through rebates—
when such “pass-through” revenue is accounted for, PBMs are the most profitable entity in
the pharmaceutical industry. See Laurie Toich, Are PBMs Downplaying Their Profits?,
PHARMACY TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/view/are-pbms-downplaying-their-profits [https://perma.cc/S79T-NZEU].
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the same time, wholesaler distributor55 and pharmacy56 revenues have also displayed consistent growth as the supply chain has become increasingly tangled.
The pharmaceutical industry itself reports robust profits, too. In fact, drug
company profit margins rank among the highest of any publicly traded corporations.57 Much of this stems from raising prices on existing drugs. One source
reports that 80% of the growth in profits from the 20 largest drug companies
resulted from raising prices on existing drugs.58 In other words, increasing profits are not due to introducing new drugs or increasing sales, just increasing prices
on existing drugs.59
As things stand, there is little incentive to impel the transformation of the
system from within. Although various parties often pin the plight of rising drug
prices on one another,60 all benefit from the system that produces them. When
the PBMs’ slice of the pie grows over time, the slice that belongs to drug companies or pharmacies does not necessarily shrink. Rather, overall prescription
drug spending continues to grow, with government payors and patients left holding the tab.61
III. HOW CAN A PIE KEEP GROWING?
Any discussion of price and efficiency in the context of healthcare requires a
tour of certain overarching characteristics of the industry. The most important
55
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See Fein, Wholesalers, supra note 12 (discussing that wholesale distributors experienced
annual revenue growth of 4–14% between 2015 and 2019, according to their increased consolidation).
56
See Fein, Pharmacies, supra note 13 (noting that fourteen of fifteen largest U.S. pharmacies saw their prescription revenue increase between 2019 and 2020).
57
Fred D. Ledley, Sarah Shonka McCoy, Gregory Vaughan & Ekaterina Galkina Cleary,
Profitability of Large Pharmaceutical Companies Compared with Other Large Public Companies, 323 JAMA 834, 837 (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2762308 [https://perma.cc/6HCW-RVNK] (stating that net income comprised 13.8% of
large pharmaceutical firms’ total revenue between 2000 and 2018, compared to other S&P
500 companies’ average of 7.7%).
58
Joseph Walker, For Prescription Drug Makers, Price Increases Drive Revenue, WALL.
ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 9:59 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/for-prescription-drug-makers-price-increases-drive-revenue-1444096750 [https://perma.cc/8QY5-95T5].
59
See id.
60
Trade groups that represent one sector of the supply chain routinely disseminate hit
pieces targeting another set of firms. See, e.g., Alicia Caramenico, With Rebates, Everyone
Pays Except for Drug Companies, AHIP (May 9, 2018), https://www.ahip.org/with-rebateseveryone-pays-except-for-drug-companies/ [https://perma.cc/24JG-S9DD] (citing research to
assert that drug company rebates do not lower prices for consumers).
61
Prescription drug spending has generally accelerated in recent years, highlighted by a
5.7% increase in 2019, up from 3.8% in 2018. See National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet,
U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-FactSheet [https://perma.cc/965J-Z762] (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
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characteristic is the following: buy-side constraints that limit price in more typical markets are dampened in the health-care market. Spending on healthcare—
whether on treatments or on insurance premiums—is not nearly so responsive
to budgetary pressures as is spending on other kinds of products and services.62
This price inelasticity is particularly strong in the market for prescription drugs,
where price increases do not readily prompt a drop in demand. Several factors
contribute to this well-documented irrationality in health-care spending.
Price increases do not dull patients’ demand for healthcare because patients
do not actually pay the full cost of healthcare. Much of the cost is paid by insurance, public and private payors. For those who do not obtain health insurance
through their employers, the government is the payor through programs like
Medicare and Medicaid. Otherwise, employer-provided health insurance is the
payor.63 Either way, the patient is relieved from paying the full cost of healthcare
because that cost is spread over a pool of covered individuals and over a period
of time.64 Even when the cost to a particular patient is staggering, health insurance often bears the brunt, if not the entirety, of the financial burden.65 In addition, some drug companies have payment assistance programs that absorb patient costs through rebates and coupons.66 Where a drug has no therapeutic
62
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HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 6–7, 36 & 119–122 nn.11–20; see also ROBIN FELDMAN
& EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF
THE MARKET 14 (2017) [hereinafter DRUG WARS] (“Many drugs are necessities for the patients
who use them, especially those for rare disorders. The price is quite inelastic, meaning that
demand is not responsive to price—people will pay whatever they need to secure the good.”).
63
Even employer-provided health insurance is partially funded by either federal or local
government through tax benefits for employers and employees. HANDSHAKES, supra note 18,
at 6 & 119 n.13; see Nicholas Drew, Two Federally Subsidized Health Insurance Programs
Are One Too Many: Reconsidering the Federal Income Tax Inclusion for Employer-Provided
Health Insurance in Light of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 54 B.C. L. REV.
2047, 2056–57 (2013) (describing government subsidy for employer-provided healthcare created by section 106 of Internal Revenue Code); Yair Listokin, Equity, Efﬁciency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON
REG. 45, 48–49 (2012) (noting government subsidy excluding “employer-provided health insurance from income tax”); Max Huffman, Competition Policy in Health Care in an Era of
Reform, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 225, 261 (2010) (observing that healthcare costs are paid with
“before tax dollars”).
64
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 6 & 119 n.12; see Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller,
Enabling Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets 7 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary
Policy at Brookings, Working Paper No. 30, 2017), www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/wp30_scottmorton_competitioninpharma1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN9VVCZN] (observing that externalities, inter alia, prevent optimal substitution by consumers
because consumers do not bear full costs).
65
Robin Feldman, Incentivizing Failure 28 & n.63 (Aug. 2, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see discussion supra note 16, and accompanying text.
66
DRUG WARS, supra note 62, at 17 & n.69; Feldman, supra note 65, at 28; HANDSHAKES,
supra note 18, at 51, 53–54; Scott Morton & Boller, supra note 64, at 27; William G.
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alternative, health insurers are sometimes required by government or patient demand to include the drug in the applicable formulary (the list of covered prescription drugs), no matter the price.67 It may be that insulating patients from the
full cost of care is by design, to prevent “sticker shock” among patients and doctors.68
The irrationality of health-care spending is also due to informational deficiencies experienced by patients qua consumers.69 Patients must rely on their
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Schiffbauer, Let’s Talk About Prescription Drug Copay Coupons: Do They Operate as Unregulated Secondary Insurance?, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Apr. 18, 2018, 12:02 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/lets-talk-about-prescription-drugcopay-coupons-do-they-operate-as-unregulated-secondary-insurance
[https://perma.cc/GG4R-FQFE] (suggesting that coupon plans constitute unregulated insurance, in which drug company handing out coupon indemniﬁes patient for any higher costsharing that may result from using branded drug); Carolyn Y. Johnson, Secret Rebates, Coupons, and Exclusions: How the Battle Over High Drug Prices Is Really Being Fought, WASH.
POST (May 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/12/thedrug-price-arms-race-that-leaves-patients-caught-in-the-middle/
[https://perma.cc/75AX7PUJ]; David Schultz, Drug Coupons: A Good Deal for the Patient, But Not the Insurer,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), https://khn.org/news/drug-coupons/
[https://perma.cc/5LW4-7YS3] (noting laws preventing those covered by federal health insurance from using coupons and detailing debate over co-pay rebates); Karen Weintraub,
Mass., 50th State, Now Allows Drug Coupons: What You Need to Know, WBUR (July 16,
2012),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2012/07/16/drug-coupons-massachusetts
[https://perma.cc/HP2D-KGS7] (covering repeal of Massachusetts’s law banning drug coupons); see also Charles Ornstein, Are Copay Coupons Actually Making Drugs More Expensive?, PROPUBLICA (June 30, 2016, 10:59 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/are-copay-coupons-actually-making-drugs-more-expensive [https://perma.cc/DK2H-S36M].
67
Medicare requires a drug from certain therapeutic groups to be included in the formulary
as well. See U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., What Medicare Part D Plans
Cover, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/drug-coverage-part-d/what-medicarepart-d-drug-plans-cover#:~:text=
All%20Medicare%20drug%20plans%20generally,similar%20drug%20should%20be%20available [https://perma.cc/K9RT-YRSL] (last visited Oct.
17, 2021). Insurers may risk losing customers if they fail to include a certain drug on their
formulary, giving the drug company leverage to charge more for a drug in demand. If a generic or cheaper competitor is not a perfect substitute, a patient’s refusal to switch is validated
by laws that require health plans to continue coverage for drugs under some circumstances.
See Feldman, supra note 65, at 27 & n.65.
68
DRUG WARS, supra note 62, at 86 (“The brunt of the costs of these schemes falls on
insurers and not patients, perhaps intentionally so that patients and doctors do not feel the
sticker shock of high prices.”).
69
Id. at 17 (“Patients require drugs, have little idea about cost, and will only pay a small
percentage of it anyway, sharply affecting their ability to respond to price.”); HANDSHAKES,
supra note 18, at 6–7 & 119 n.12; Scott Morton & Boller, supra note 64, at 2 (noting that
information asymmetries, inter alia, prevent optimal substitution by consumers because consumers lack medical expertise or reliable information with which to identify therapeutic
equivalents).
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healthcare professionals.70 The professional, not the patient, determines what
medication must be prescribed, and, hence, what drug must be purchased.71
However, the professional’s determination may be subject to economic factors,
such as the availability of insurance reimbursement for the drug, or factors distant from the merits, such as the wooing of physicians by drug companies.72 In
some cases, direct-to-consumer advertising can induce patients to purchase, or
request prescription of, a particular drug.73 While patients could benefit greatly
if companies provided them with reliable information on price and quality, the
provision of such information in a comprehensible form can be difficult, even
absent the distracting seductions of advertising.74
70

HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 7.
Id.
72
Id. at 7 & 120 n.15; see Open Payments, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
www.cms.gov/openpayments/ [https://perma.cc/6NLZ-G6R3] (identifying value and nature
of companies’ payments to physicians).
73
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 7 & 120 n.14; DRUG WARS, supra note 62, at 15 & nn.
60–61; Kathryn J. Aiken, John L. Swasy & Amie C. Braman, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
Patient and Physician Attitudes and Behaviors Associated with DTC Promotion of Prescription Drugs—Summary of FDA Survey Research Results 2, 26–27 (2004),
https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Patient-and-Physician-Attitudes-and-BehaviorsAssociated-With-DTC-Promotion-of-Prescription-Drugs-Final-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9HJ-46B6] (demonstrating that advertising dramatically increases number
of patient requests or inquiries about specific drugs). Only two industrialized nations allow
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) for prescription medication: the United States and
New Zealand. Bruce Patsner, Problems Associated with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
(DTCA) of Restricted, Implantable Medical Devices: Should the Current Regulatory Approach Be Changed?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2009) (stating that “aside from New Zealand, DTCA is banned in every other Western industrialized nation except the United States”);
Keeping Watch Over Direct-to-Consumer Ads, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://web.archive.org/web/20171213072240/ [https://perma.cc/YL3L-5BMC]; Erin J. Asher, Lesson
Learned from New Zealand: Pro-Active Industry Shift Towards Self-Regulation of Direct-toConsumer Advertising Will Improve Compliance with the FDA, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
599, 614 (2006) (“New Zealand is currently the only other industrialized country in the world
besides the United States to allow DTC advertising.”).
74
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 7 & 120–121 nn.16-17; Letter from Marina Lao, Deborah L. Feinstein & Francine Lafontaine, Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff, to Rep. Joe Hoppe & Rep.
Melissa Hortman, Minn. House of Reps. 4–5 (June 29, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-regarding-amendments-minnesota-government-data-practices-act-regarding-health-care/150702minnhealthcare.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G36A-6B9H]. See Christopher Whaley, Jennifer Schneider Chafen, Sophie
Pinkard, Gabriella Kellerman, Dena Bravata, Robert Kocher & Neeraj Sood, Association Between Availability of Health Service Prices and Payments for These Services, 312 JAMA
1670, 1670–1676 (2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-791, HEALTH CARE
PRICE TRANSPARENCY: MEANINGFUL PRICE INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT FOR CONSUMERS TO
OBTAIN PRIOR TO RECEIVING CARE 1–2 (2011), www.gao.gov/assets/590/585400.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HVG-RCD3]; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Examining Health Care Competition
71
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Most importantly, the ordinary budget limitations of the consumer, while reining in the prices of other monopolists, do not rein in the prices of health-care
monopolists.75 Outside of the health-care context, the consumer may be willing
to pay high prices set by a monopolistic seller of good X, but there are limits to
how high the monopolist can raise the price of X. The consumer has a finite
budget and a list of items on which money must be spent, whether they are necessities like food, clothing, and housing, or desirables like the occasional movie
out with the family.76 The portion of the consumer’s budget that can be spent
paying the price charged by the non-health-care monopolist is necessarily limited by the consumer’s must-spend list.77 But in the health-care context, those
ordinary budget limitations do not prevent the monopolist from charging prices
(and obtaining payments) that would not otherwise be possible. To take a simple
real-world example, healthcare is often a matter of life and death; since the consumer’s life is infinitely valuable to the consumer, the consumer will pay colossal sums of money for a health-care product—say, a novel chemotherapy—that
will prolong the consumer’s life, often for only a short period.78 The consumer’s
payment of such sums, for minimal extension of life, earns the health-care monopolist profits beyond what the non-health-care monopolist will make.
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Webcast (Feb. 24, 2015) (transcript available at www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/02/examining-health-care-competition); High Prices, Low Transparency: The Bitter Pill of Health Care Costs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 8–9 (2013)
(statement of Paul B. Ginsburg, President, Center for Studying Health System Change),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/high-prices-low-transparency-the-bitter-pill-ofhealth-care-costs [https://perma.cc/M2Y8-7LXL].
75
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 6 & 119 n.10; Brian A. Hearn, Nicola Amendola &
Giovanni Vecchi, On Historical Household Budgets, (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working
Paper No. 45, 2016), https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers/on-historicalhousehold-budgets [https://perma.cc/C2FC-HUJ5]; Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and
Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1005 & n.82 (1986) (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMICS 251 (4th ed. 1982)); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance:
American Social Wage, Labor Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. REV. 259, 298
(1994).
76
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 6.
77
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 6 & 119 n.10; Hearn, supra note 75, at 4–5; Campbell,
supra note 75; Casebeer, supra note 75.
78
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 7 & 121 n.19. Of total healthcare spending in the United
States, 8.5% is for individuals in their last year of life. See Alan R. Weil, Advanced Illness
and End-of-Life Care, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1167, 1167 (2017); Courtney Davis, Huseyin Naci,
Evrim Gurpinar, Elita Poplavska, Ashlyn Pinto & Ajay Aggarwal, Availability of Evidence of
Beneﬁts on Overall Survival and Quality of Life of Cancer Drugs Approved by European
Medicines Agency: Retrospective Cohort Study of Drug Approvals 2009–13, 359 BMJ 4530
(2017),
https://www.bmj.com/content/359/bmj.j4530 [https://perma.cc/LDC4-F3XB]
(“The magnitude of the beneﬁt on overall survival ranged from 1.0 to 5.8 months (median 2.7
months).”).
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In short, irrationality in healthcare markets leads to decisions that would be
considered irrational in other budgetary contexts.79 The irrationality is even
more marked when the consumer understands that someone else—the health insurer—is footing the bill.80 Although every health-care decision is not a life-anddeath matter, the difference is frequently a matter of degree: for the consumer,
today’s non-emergency treatment could prevent tomorrow’s life-threatening impairment. The bottom line is that the gravity of health-related issues leads to a
market that is typified by distorted purchasing decisions81 and that can only be
described as irrational.82
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79
See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 7 & 121 n.18; Wendy Netter Epstein, Revisiting
Incentive-Based Contracts, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 11–14 (2017) (describing skewed economic incentives in healthcare); Clive Crook, The Slippery Economics of
Health Care, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2005), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/10/the-slippery-economics-of-health-care/304394/
[https://perma.cc/ZHL9DEZE] (describing lack of consumer incentives in healthcare decision making); DAVID
GRATZER, THE CURE: HOW CAPITALISM CAN SAVE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 42 (2006);
ARNOLD S. KLING, CRISIS OF ABUNDANCE: RETHINKING HOW WE PAY FOR HEALTH CARE 53–
54 (2006); William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidiaries, Third-Party-Payments, and Cross-Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 279, 282 (2009) (citing
E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care: Bringing Patients into
Alignment, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 89, 95, 139 (1996)); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reorganizing the
Financial Flows in American Health Care, 12 HEALTH AFF. 172, 176 (Supp. 1993); Jennifer
Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a New Paradigm of Health Ethics, Policy and Law, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 476 (2006) (noting efforts to manufacture
economic incentives through “inappropriate” and “deleterious” insurance deductibles and copayment schemes to help healthcare purchases mimic typical economic rationales); see also
Marie McCullough, Breakthrough Cancer Therapy Raises Tough Questions about Drug
Costs, Value, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/breakthrough-cancer-therapy-raises-tough-questions-about-drugcosts-and-value-20180207.html [https://perma.cc/Y5ZQ-2X2K] (quoting one commentator’s
assertion that the “key question is not: What’s it worth to save a child’s life… If that was [sic]
the question, the polio (vaccine) they gave me when I was 6 years old would have cost a
million dollars. The right question is: What is the price that will maximize accessibility and
affordability, while maintaining a robust R&D pipeline”).
80
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 7.
81
Id. at 6 & 119 n.11. Buying distortions in the healthcare market are described more fully
in DRUG WARS, supra note 62, at 13 (noting that “pharmaceutical market does not operate
much like a standard market at all”); Clifford D. Stromberg, Health Law Comes of Age: Economics and Ethics in a Changing Industry, 92 YALE L.J. 203, 209–11 (1982) (reviewing
WILLIAM J. CURRAN & E. DONALD SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE (3rd ed.
1982)); Abigail Moncrieff, Understanding the Failure of Health-Care Exceptionalism in the
Supreme Court’s Obamacare Decision, 142 CHEST 559, 559 (2012) (observing that in constitutional challenge to Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Supreme Court’s failure to
employ healthcare exceptionalism was “odd” holding that disregards uniqueness of healthcare
market).
82
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 6–7 & 121 n.18.
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IV. INTERESTS SERVED
Obviously, profits are an interest. But the profit motive alone does not explain
the baroque arrangement of the pharmaceutical supply chain. Habits and pathways develop for a reason. This section will trace the factors that shaped the
emergence of various intermediaries and their interactions.
A. The Emergence of Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs)
As described in Section I, pharmacy benefit managers, or PBMs, play a crucial role in directing the flow of payments between patients, health plans, drug
companies, wholesalers, distributors, and other members of the pharmaceutical
supply chain.83 But as much as PBMs’ oversized role may seem like a fixture of
the system, it is in fact the product of relatively recent historical circumstances.
The precursor to the PBM was a company called Pharmaceutical Card System
(PCS), which opened its doors in 1969.84 PCS handled prescription processing
for medical insurance companies, formulary lists, and pharmacy reimbursements, collecting a fee for every claim processed.85 McKesson, then the largest
drug distributor in the U.S.,86 bought PCS in 1970 in order to develop additional
businesses—pharmacy benefit managers—that would operate under a similar
model.87 The timing was fortuitous: rising drug prices and a stagnant economy
were stirring bipartisan anxiety over healthcare costs. In 1973, the Nixon administration passed the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act,88 which heralded a shift from the private healthcare policies of the postwar period to “managed care,”89 wherein patients pay less to access a more restrictive set of services
within a delineated network of hospitals and providers.90 To control the cost of
the prescription drug benefit, insurers developed outpatient drug formularies, or
lists of the medications they covered.91 At the same time, HMOs and other insurance companies outsourced their claims to PBMs for processing in order to
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See generally Feldman, Devil, supra note 17; HANDSHAKES, supra note 18; Robin Feldman, Why Prescription Drug Prices Have Skyrocketed, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Feldman, WASH. POST], https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/26/whyprescription-drug-prices-have-skyrocketed/ [https://perma.cc/V4FH-WLWF].
84
POSNER, supra note 11, at 392.
85
Id.
86
McKesson remains one of the largest drug wholesale distributors in the U.S. See Fein,
Wholesalers, supra note 12.
87
POSNER, supra note 11, at 392.
88
See Health Maint. Org. Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973).
89
POSNER, supra note 11, at 390.
90
See, e.g., Appendix B. A Brief History of Managed Care, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
https://www.ncd.gov/policy/appendix-b-brief-history-managed-care
[https://perma.cc/WZ7A-QFJH].
91
Feldman, Devil, supra note 17, at 12.
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reduce their own bureaucratic labor. Riding on this wave, PBMs acquired tens
of millions of customers over the next decade.92
Between the 1980s and early 2000s, PBMs took on a more involved role in
the pharmaceutical supply chain.93 By introducing mail order drug delivery programs, PBMs edged out corner drugstores; by developing computer software
that made it easier and faster to process prescriptions, PBMs inserted themselves
into retail pharmacy chains as in-house service providers.94 PBMs’ expanding
middleman function quickly entrenched PBMs in the system as a source of drug
history information for the patients they served.95 But it wasn’t until the 2006
enactment of Medicare Part D—the Voluntary Prescription Drug Benefit Program—that PBMs’ position in the pharmaceutical supply chain took on the dimensions it has today.96 A component of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Medicare Part D incorporated
prescription drug coverage into Medicare.97 The resulting wave of new patients
with prescription drug coverage prompted health plans to give PBMs two new
and significant responsibilities: designing formularies for health plans and extracting rebates from drug companies.98
Since the 1984 passage of the Hatch–Waxman Act, which facilitated the entry
of generic drugs to market, brand-name drug companies had been looking to lay

92

POSNER, supra note 11, at 392.
Throughout the 1990s, drug companies—following the lead of Merck, which bought
Medco in 1993—began to acquire PBMs in recognition of their ability to assert control over
drug pricing, which was previously the domain of the companies. Once the FTC caused drug
companies to divest from PBMs, PBMs began to acquire other PBMs instead. The market
consolidated to the point that, by 2015, just three companies—CVS Caremark, Express
Scripts, and UnitedHealth Optum—controlled 73% of the market. See MENTAL HEALTH AM.
OF
CAL.,
Fact
Sheet:
Pharmacy
Benefit
Managers,
CONNECTION
COAL., http://www.mhac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Fact-Sheet-PBMs-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X747-V8EJ] (“It was during the mid to late 1990’s that drug manufacturers
purchased PBMs (e.g., Merck purchased Medco in 1993). Yet, the FTC considered these relationships a conflict of interest and required the manufacturers to divest themselves of the
PBMs. Subsequently, between 1998 and 2003 the manufacturers severed ownership of their
PBM.”); see also Matan C. Dabora, Namrata Turaga, Kevin A. Schulman, Financing and
Distribution of Pharmaceuticals in the United States, 318 JAMA 21, 21 (2017) [hereinafter
Dabora, Financing and Distribution] (“PBMs developed in the 1980s as employers added
outpatient prescription drug coverage to their health insurance plans. By 2015, industry consolidation had resulted in 3 PBMs—CVS Caremark, Express Scripts, and UnitedHealth’s Optum—controlling a 73% share of the PBM market.”).
94
POSNER, supra note 11, at 393.
95
Id.
96
Feldman, WASH. POST, supra note 83; see also Feldman, Devil, supra note 17, at 10.
97
See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
98
See Feldman, Devil, supra note 17.
93
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bulwarks against the erosion of their dominance.99 To offset the flood of cheaper
options generic companies presented patients, brand drug companies began vying for favorable placement in insurers’ formularies by offering rebates to insurance companies.100 The enactment of Medicare Part D put both ends of this process in the hands of PBMs. Insurers pay PBMs a portion of the rebate that PBMs
negotiate, which is supposed to incentivize PBMs to push for larger discounts.101
Similarly, the formulary structure is supposed to incentivize patients to choose
cheaper drugs by placing these drugs on lower “tiers” and providing that lower
tiers have lower out-of-pocket payments for patients.102 These incentives theoretically work together to keep healthcare costs down for insurers and patients
alike.103
Instead, PBMs and drug companies treat the former as a means of securing
the latter. Rather than tendering greater discounts, pharmaceutical companies
simply raise their list prices, which enables them to grant PBMs a steeper rebate
without offsetting any costs104—a move that PBMs encourage without oversight105—by offering companies better or worse formulary placement, or even
the exclusion of a competitor from the formulary, depending on the amount they
can earn from the deal.106 To exacerbate matters, the prices around which these
negotiations revolve are hidden.107 Contracts between PBMs and health plans
are based on the size of the rebate the signatories believe the PBM can negotiate,
but the health plan never learns how big the rebate actually is, meaning the PBM

99

See generally DRUG WARS, supra note 62.
See id. at 70; see also HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 20.
101
See Feldman, Devil, supra note 17, at 12; HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 17 (describing
how incentives are intended to work along pharmaceutical supply chain).
102
See Feldman, Devil, supra note 17, at 3.
103
See generally Feldman, Devil, supra note 17.
104
See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 18–19; see also Feldman, WASH. POST, supra note
83.
105
See POSNER, supra note 11, at 495 (“PBMs are the only unregulated part of the pharmaceutical supply chain. [For PBMs,] [t]here are no requirements for public transparency. [And
PBMs] have [no] legal obligation to disclose to anyone the rebates they received from pharma
companies.”).
106
See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 18–19; Feldman, Devil, supra note 17, at 15–16
(summarizing lawsuits concerning Johnson & Johnson, Sanofi Pasteur, and Allergan); see
also Complaint at 1, Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31690 (E.D.
Pa. 2017) (No. 17-CV-4180) (E.D. Pa. dismissed per stipulation July 20, 2021); Complaint at
3, Castro v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174708 (D.N.J. 2011) (No. 11-CV7178) (D.N.J. dismissed Oct. 20, 2017); Complaint at 6, Shire U.S., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., 375
F. Supp. 3d 538 (D.N.J. 2017) (No. 17-CV-7716).
107
See Feldman & Graves, supra note 20, at 72; see also supra text accompanying notes
45, 46.
100
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keeps the difference if the rebate is larger than anticipated.108 The “black box”
nature of this process is by design: as the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act made its way through Congress, pharmaceutical
companies lobbied to make sure the Act explicitly barred Medicare from negotiating drug prices.109 In so doing, the industry set up PBMs to take on the expansive and domineering role they play today. The 2010 Affordable Care Act
includes a similar provision.110
B. The Emergence of Volume Rebating
PBMs do not act alone. Drug companies exploit PBMs’ intermediary role in
the pharmaceutical supply chain to hoard market share and keep out competitors.
One significant way in which this happens is through the practice of volume
rebating.
Volume rebating can take several forms. At the most basic level, an entrenched drug company takes advantage of its established position in the market
by promising a PBM a bigger profit if the PBM sells more of the drug company’s
product.111 The drug company does so by offering to pay the PBM a certain
amount of money per unit of product sold. Given that the entrenched drug company can offer more units of the product, a new competitor that does not have
the resources or market share to sell as many units simply cannot pay the PBM
the same level of compensation, no matter how cheaply the new competitor
prices its drug. The entrenched drug company thereby prevents the new competitor from gaining a foothold in the market, padding PBM pockets along the way.
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108
See Feldman, Perverse Incentives, supra note 20, at 327 (“Moreover, the contract between the PBM and the insurance plan is based on the rebate level the parties think the PBM
will be able to negotiate, while the insurance plan is never permitted to know the actual level
of that rebate. If the rebate is more than the companies anticipated, the PBM pockets that
difference as well.”).
109
See, e.g., Dabora, Financing and Distribution, supra note 93; Fact Sheet: How Much
Money Could Medicare Save By Negotiating Prescription Drug Prices? COMM. FOR A
RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.crfb.org/press-releases/fact-sheethow-much-money-could-medicare-save-negotiating-prescription-drug-prices
[https://perma.cc/U3DJ-486M] (“Federal law currently prohibits the Secretary of Health and
Human Services from negotiating prescription drug prices. Only Congress has the power to
change this law.”); POSNER, supra note 11, at 495 (“The pharmaceutical industry lobbied to
ensure that the legislation [the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act] explicitly prevented the government from negotiating drug prices.”).
110
See Brett Norman & Sarah Karlin-Smith, The One That Got Away: Obamacare and the
Drug Industry, POLITICO (July 13, 2016, 5:32 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/obamacare-prescription-drugs-pharma-225444
[https://perma.cc/KH89-8752] (“No government negotiations of drug price—although both
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton have endorsed Medicare negotiations.”).
111
See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 21–22 (walking through the incentives underlying
the practice of volume rebating).
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The situation may be analogized as follows.112 Imagine a major alcohol company approaching a bar owner with a proposal: if the bar owner sells 50,000
bottles of the company’s beer, the company will pay her fifty cents per bottle. If
the bar owner sells 50,000 bottles of the company’s beer and refuses to put a
certain competing microbrewery’s beer on the menu, the company will pay her
a dollar per bottle. The microbrewery cannot compete if it can only make a limited number of bottles of beer; the alcohol company’s proposal essentially
squeezes the microbrewery out of a deal with the bar and preserves for the company a larger share of the bar’s beer sales.
To be clear, volume rebating is neither unique to the pharmaceutical industry
nor inherently anticompetitive.113 For example, a manufacturer of computer
chips may attempt to attract a technology company’s business by offering a volume discount on its chips.114 Neither the manufacturer’s success in attracting the
technology company’s business, nor even the technology company’s decision to
purchase all of its chips from the single manufacturer, would necessarily herald
anticompetitive behavior.115 But context is key. In the pharmaceutical industry,
volume rebating enables drug companies to prolong the monopoly rewards of a
patent that had been granted by the government with the understanding that those
rewards would be finite. Moreover, volume rebating determines which drugs a
PBM includes in the health plan’s formulary.116 While a consumer can elect to
buy a computer from a different technology company, a patient cannot always
choose to forego a drug or to switch to a different drug because the one they
need is too expensive.117 Yet these are the options left open to patients when
drug companies engage in volume rebating.
Volume rebates become even less surmountable when multiplied across drug
classes. In this situation, also known as “bundled,” “packaged,” or “loyalty” rebating, a drug company tells the PBM that in order to receive the best rebate, the
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The following analogy is adapted from id.
See Fiona Scott Morton, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Speech at the
Georgetown University Law Center Antitrust Seminar: Contracts that Reference Rivals 2
(Apr. 5, 2012), (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518971/download
[https://perma.cc/4TYH-K4LK]).
114
This example is adapted from HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 28.
115
Scott Morton, supra note 113, at 5 (“For instance, observing that a buyer has bought
exclusively from one seller is not necessarily a problem: sellers may bid for a buyer’s business, and a particular buyer may choose to extract all surplus by buying from one seller.”).
116
See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 28 (describing unique consequences of volume rebating in drug industry).
117
Alternately, the patient could choose to enroll in a different health plan. However, these
choices are often limited not only by the patient’s employer or geographic region, but by
numerous other considerations, including cost and the coverage of other needed drugs or services. See id. at 29.
113
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PBM must sell a certain quantity of each of several drugs in a portfolio.118 To
put that in terms of the bar analogy, the alcohol company tells the bar owner it
will offer her a better discount if, in addition to selling a certain number of bottles
of beer, she also sells a certain amount of the company’s whiskey and vodka.
Even if the microbrewery could compete with the company’s beer proposal, it
would nevertheless be edged out of the market due to its inability to manufacture
equivalent quantities of whiskey and vodka and offer a similarly high discount
across the same range of drinks. With this method, drug companies can leverage
dominant products in its portfolio—for example, a major drug still under patent
protection that has no branded therapeutic or generic alternatives—to protect its
market share in products that are under threat from competitors by bundling the
therapeutic or generic products with the dominant portfolio products. Because
health plans must offer at least one drug in each therapeutic class, such bundled
rebates are particularly attractive to PBMs.119
Volume rebates block smaller drug companies and generic drug companies
from gaining traction in the market. They also enable brand drug companies to
extend their patent-driven monopolies well beyond the expiration of those patents. Brand drug companies may sweeten the deal by paying PBMs extra money
under labels such as “data management fees” or “administrative fees.”120 While
the rebate payment scheme at least nominally encourages PBMs to seek out
larger discounts, these extra fees are untethered from any such obligation. With
these discounts, drug companies sway PBMs even further from the supposed
mission of lowering costs.

118
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See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 21; see also Robin Feldman, Defensive Leveraging
in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080, 2104–05 (1999) (describing similar notion of defensive
leveraging in which firm uses monopoly on one product to help preserve its monopoly in
another market). As an example, Eli Lilly, an antibiotic monopolist in the 1970s, required
hospitals to purchase three of its five antibiotic products to receive a rebate. The program
impeded new competitor SmithKline from entering with its two new antibiotic products because the collective rebate amount across the five drugs was too high for SmithKline to match
on a single drug. See SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1060, 1062 (3d Cir.
1978).
119
See U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 67 (explaining mandate
to include drug from each therapeutic group).
120
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 15 & 131–32 n.84; see also Response Letter from Eric
R. Slusser, Exec. Vice President/CFO, Express Scripts Holding Co., to Div. Corp. Fin., U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jun. 26, 2017) (available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001532063/000119312517213574/filename1.htm
[https://perma.cc/YSV6EZXY]) (responding to SEC request for more information on rebate program: “We administer
a rebate program through which we receive rebates and administrative fees from pharmaceutical manufacturers.”); Linda Cahn, Don’t Get Trapped By PBMs’ Rebate Labeling Games,
MANAGED CARE MAG., www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2009/1/don-t-get-trappedpbms-rebate-labeling-games [https://perma.cc/JMW9-VG6C]. PBM fee amounts are on the
rise in recent years, nearly quadrupling between 2014 and 2016. See Zirkelbach, supra note
53.
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Most insidious of all is the fact that the details of these payments and prices—
from the pre-rebate price of the drug to the size of the rebate itself to the existence and quantity of any fees—are obscured from other supply chain entities as
well as from regulators and the public.121 The health plan sees only the price a
patient pays when purchasing a drug and the total rebate the PBM has secured
after it has deducted its portion, a lack of transparency that PBMs and drug companies justify with spurious trade secrecy claims.122 This arrangement allows
PBMs to continue to mine for profits under a cloak of obfuscation that hides the
dollar flow along with the very workings of the pharmaceutical supply chain
itself.
C. The Emergence of Wholesale Distributors
Wholesale distributors have been part of the pharmaceutical supply chain for
much longer than PBMs, though wholesale distributors’ role in driving up prices
is likewise a relatively recent development.
Drug companies have sold their products wholesale to intermediaries who
distribute them to retailers since the 1800s, a century before the pharmaceutical
industry as we know it grew out of World War II–era research initiatives.123
McKesson and AmerisourceBergen, two of the “Big Three” drug wholesale distributors operating in the United States today, were established in 1833124 and
1871,125 respectively. The third largest wholesale distributor, Cardinal Health,
was originally founded in 1971 as a food distributor.126 Over the long history of
their existence, wholesale distributors’ place in the pharmaceutical supply chain
has not gone uncontested. In the 1940s, following in the vertically integrated
Squibb’s lead, some drug companies underwent corporate restructuring to try
and eliminate their need to deal with a middleman.127 These decisions were made
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See Feldman & Graves, supra note 20, at 72 (describing how trade secrecy claims serve
to guard contract information from parties—including health plans and auditors).
122
Id.
123
See generally POSNER, supra note 11.
124
Our History: Advancing Healthcare, MCKESSON, https://www.mckesson.com/AboutMcKesson/Our-History/
[https://perma.cc/HR5S-NC2P].
125
Our History, AMERISOURCEBERGEN, https://www.amerisourcebergen.com/aboutus/our-history [https://perma.cc/8Q25-WHNQ].
126
Executive
Interview:
Bob
Walter,
J.
HEALTHCARE
CONTRACTING,
https://www.jhconline.com/executive-interview-bob-walter.html [https://perma.cc/4CSQXHPG].
127
See POSNER, supra note 11, at 49 (“Despite the intense competition, Squibb’s penicillin
profit margins were 10 percent better than the average of its top four rivals. That was because
it was the only vertically integrated firm, not only manufacturing the drug, but packaging it
before selling it to hospitals, clinics, and physicians. Competitors only made it and then relied
on packages and wholesale distributors. Starting in the late 1940s, Pfizer, Merck, Lilly, and
Parke-Davis created internal divisions to eliminate the middlemen.”).
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in an effort to bolster profits on penicillin, then a newly invented wonder drug.128
But drug companies and wholesale distributors have since come to work in tandem to extract profits from the system.
Unusually for a product distributor, drug wholesale distributors make most of
their profits from the buy-side rather than the sell-side, partly due to cost pressure on providers by Medicare, Medicaid, insurance companies, and other thirdparty payers.129 Throughout the 1990s, drug wholesale distributors capitalized
on drug companies’ annual price increases—which regularly averaged one percent above inflation—via investment buying: wholesale distributors purchased
large quantities of drugs in anticipation of the increase, then sold their inventory
at a small markup.130 Investment buying was a boon for drug companies, too,
who found in wholesale distributors a receptive partner for channel stuffing, a
process through which companies inflate their sales figures by pushing extra
product through a distributor.131 In 2002, however, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched a probe into Bristol-Myers Squibb for this
practice.132 Though the SEC did not end up finding Bristol-Myers guilty (the
company settled for $150 million instead133) the anxiety the probe provoked
among wholesale distributors prompted them to inaugurate the payment model
in place today.134
128

Id.
See Leroy B. Schwarz & Hui Zhao, The Unexpected Impact of Information Sharing on
U.S. Pharmaceutical Supply Chains, 41 INTERFACES 354, 355 (2011) (“Indeed, unlike distributors of most other products who earn money on the ‘sell side,’ pharmaceutical distributors
earn most of their gross margin from the manufacturers whose products they distribute….
Distributors earn their margin on the buy side for many reasons; these include the buying
power of large retail pharmaceutical chains that dispense the majority of pharmaceuticals, and
cost pressure on providers (e.g., hospitals) by third-party payers (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid,
and insurance companies). This cost pressure encouraged the development of healthcare
group-purchasing organizations, which negotiate the prices that their (otherwise unaffiliated)
provider members pay for pharmaceuticals and other supplies.”).
130
See id. at 355–56.
131
See id. at 356.
132
SEC Eyes Bristol-Myers, CNN MONEY (July 11, 2002, 4:36 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2002/07/11/news/companies/bristolmyers/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/B4R4-J7ES] (“The company made so many sales to wholesalers last year
that inventories built up too much, causing the company to have to restate its revenue and
earnings expectations for 2002. The SEC wants to know if the company inflated sales purposefully by offering incentives to wholesalers—including warnings that it planned to raise
prices on some of its products—in order to meet last year’s revenue targets. Analysts have
said the company’s sales practices may have boosted revenue by as much as $1 billion”).
133
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Agrees to
Pay $150 Million to Settle Fraud Charges (Aug. 4, 2004) (available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-105.htm [https://perma.cc/3SJQ-T5GS]).
134
See Schwarz & Zhao, supra note 129, at 357; see also Adam J. Fein, Drive the Right
Supply
Chain
Behaviors,
HARV.
BUS.
REV.
(Aug.
2005),
129
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Under this model, wholesale distributors and brand drug companies come to
terms known by any of several acronyms: “distribution service agreements”
(DSA), “fee for service agreements” (FFS), “inventory management agreements” (IMA), or “distribution performance agreements” (DPA).135 In what is
essentially a safeguard against the appearance of channel stuffing, drug companies offer wholesale distributors a discount on their products if wholesale distributors keep their inventories low.136 Drug companies also pay wholesale distributors a percentage of the brand drug’s list price, also called the “wholesale
acquisition cost” (WAC), as compensation for distributing the drugs as well as
for taking on financial responsibility for them.137 By purchasing and taking legal
ownership of the drug company’s products, the wholesale distributor absorbs
credit risk for holding and reselling inventory.138
Of course, this compensation scheme means that wholesale distributors’ profits grow whenever drug companies raise the list price; when the list price rises,
the fee earned by wholesale distributors rises because the fee is a percentage of
list price.139 How the scheme incentivizes wholesale distributors to rely on price
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http://www.pembrokeconsulting.com/pdfs/Drive~the~Right~Behaviors-Fein-August2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5MYA6KT].
135
See Adam J. Fein, How Wholesalers Profit from Brand-Name Drug Inflation (But Probably Not as Much as You Think), DRUG CHANNELS (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.drugchannels.net/2015/10/how-wholesalers-profit-from-brand-name.html
[https://perma.cc/GY42WBRT] [hereinafter Fein, Inflation].
136
See Schwarz & Zhao, supra note 129, at 357–58.
137
See id.; Fein, Inflation, supra note 135 (“DSA fees are generally computed as a percentage of a brand-name drug’s list price. Therefore, the dollar value of a wholesaler’s fee payment from the manufacturer rises whenever a manufacturer increases a drug’s list price—the
Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC). Gross profits increase because the wholesaler’s fees are
computed based on the new, higher price. The wholesaler could also benefit by selling inventory purchased at the older price at the new higher price.”).
138
See The High Cost of Access: Fact or Fiction?, AMERISOURCEBERGEN, https://www.amerisourcebergen.com/brand-stories/mythbusting-the-high-cost-of-access
[https://perma.cc/9ZXP-WVUV] [hereinafter AMERISOURCEBERGEN, High Cost] (“[Perhaps]
most importantly, distributors take on financial risk by taking title to and carrying inventory.
We also extend credit for the products we buy from manufacturers and sell to customers.
Distributors infuse critical cash into manufacturers’ areas of core competency (like R&D) and
ensure critical products are on pharmacy shelves for the customers who need them.”); Adam
J. Fein, Building a New Drug Wholesaler Compensation Model: What Happens as Brand
Inflation Slows?, DRUG CHANNELS (July 24, 2018), https://www.drugchannels.net/2018/07/building-new-drug-wholesaler.html
[https://perma.cc/9BRK-MXTV]
[hereinafter Fein, New Compensation Model] (“[Wholesalers] also play a crucial role in the
financial transactions within the drug distribution system. They purchase and take title (legal
ownership) to a manufacturer’s product and absorb credit risk when reselling a manufacturer’s
products. As a result of this channel role, the two biggest components of wholesalers’ current
assets are (1) the product inventories purchased from manufacturers and owned by the wholesaler, and (2) the accounts receivables that customers owe to wholesalers.”).
139
See e.g., Fein, Inflation, supra note 135.
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hikes, however, is less straightforward than it may first appear. Although wholesale distributors are occasionally able to bolster their margins by selling inventory purchased at a pre-hike price at the new post-hike price, drug companies
tend to guard against this possibility by including recapture and revaluation
clauses in their service agreements.140 Under these clauses, the wholesale distributor must return to the drug company the difference between the value of the
inventory before and after a price increase.141 The wholesale distributor’s profits
still increase because the WAC, and therefore the WAC fee, has increased, but
its gross margins stay the same.142 As a result, the wholesale distributor becomes
dependent on regular price hikes in order to maintain its margins and satisfy its
stakeholders—even though it may continue to make a more-than-healthy profit
from its WAC fee.143
Meanwhile, drug companies do not have to report the amount the wholesale
distributor pays them following each revaluation,144 contributing to the confusion over the price paid for a drug by any given entity in the pharmaceutical
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140
See Adam J. Fein, McKesson’s Profit Shortfall: How Wholesalers Benefit from Rising
Drug List Prices, DRUG CHANNELS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.drugchannels.net/2017/01/mckessons-profit-shortfall-how.html [https://perma.cc/24UD-3J48] [hereinafter Fein, Shortfall] (describing recapture and revaluation clauses).
141
See id.
142
See id.; Adam J. Fein, What McKesson’s Profit Warning Means for Manufacturers and
Pharmacies, DRUG CHANNELS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.drugchannels.net/2016/10/whatmckessons-profit-warning-means-for.html [https://perma.cc/CX9T-P8A9] [hereinafter Fein,
Profit Warning].
143
See Fein, Profit Warning, supra note 142. Fein quotes from an interview with John
Hammergren, Chairman, President, and CEO of McKesson:
[W]here a manufacturer’s behavior has changed dramatically from its previous behavior and
we had come to depend on those mechanisms as part of our funding source with that manufacturer, I think we have every right to go back to those manufacturers and say, listen, we
need to open the dialog again because by your unilateral decision, you have significantly impacted our profitability on your particular product lines and we don’t think that’s fair and we
want to recover that lost margin.
Id. Fein glosses the statement as follows: “Here, a ‘manufacturer’s behavior’ means its list
price increases. Hammergren’s statement implies that McKesson will go after manufacturers
that make a ‘unilateral decision’ not to increase WAC list prices.” Id. See also
AMERISOURCEBERGEN, High Cost, supra note 138 (“Myth: Distributors benefit from—and
encourage—high drug prices. Fact: Wholesalers’ fees are in direct correlation to the amount
of risk they take on for a product.”). Note that AmerisourceBergen does not explicitly rebut
wholesale distributors’ role in driving up drug prices—it only explains why they are justified
for receiving them.
144
Fein, Shortfall, supra note 140 (“The manufacturer gains the value of price increase on
product that has been purchased by wholesaler but not yet sold to wholesaler’s customer….
[These] sums therefore have important implications for government pricing and manufacturer’s channel compensation approaches. Revaluation amounts can be substantial, although
manufacturers do not typically report the value of inventory revaluation received from wholesalers.”).
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supply chain.145 Because state governments use these prices to calculate the
amount they reimburse pharmacies for prescription drugs dispensed via Medicaid,146 the consequences of hidden transactions extend not only to patients but
to taxpayers. A 2005 report from the Department of Health and Human Services
put it frankly:
[State] Medicaid agencies generally use AWP [average wholesale price]
and/or WAC to estimate pharmacy acquisition costs for drug reimbursement.
However, studies, investigations, and audits by OIG [Office of Inspector General], the Department of Justice, and others have found that these published
prices, particularly AWP, substantially overstate the actual prices pharmacies
pay for drugs.147
Consequently: “because States lack accurate drug pricing data, Medicaid drug
reimbursements exceed pharmacies’ actual acquisition costs.”148
D. The Emergence of “Hidden Brokers”
The byzantine structure of the pharmaceutical supply chain has also given rise
to hidden brokers like Pharmacy Services Administrative Organizations
(PSAOs) and Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs), acronyms tucked between pharmacies and other intermediaries.149 Although these brokers may
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145
See generally Gencarelli, supra note 41 (describing problems with use of average wholesale price (AWP) for reimbursement by Medicaid, Medicare, and other government drug purchasing programs); Leigh Ann Anderson, Average Wholesale Price (AWP) as a Pricing
Benchmark, DRUGS.COM (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.drugs.com/article/average-wholesaleprice-awp.html [https://perma.cc/8GCZ-227J] (“Reimbursements from insurance companies
(including. [sic] pharmacy benefit managers—PBMs) may be based on AWPs. However,
pharmacies purchase drugs based on the WAC. The difference between the WAC (what the
pharmacy actually paid for the drug) and the reimbursement from insurance (based on AWP)
is known as the spread and equates to the profit that the pharmacy receives. Market pricing
on brand name drugs tends to be roughly 15% less than the AWP. However, the relation of
AWP to generic pricing is not clear. Older generics tend to have a large spread between the
AWP and WAC, which in turn gives a large spread and higher profit margins for the pharmacy
or other provider of the drug…. Collusion between AWP publishers and wholesalers to artificially inflate the AWP (a 25% markup instead of a 20% markup), and in turn increase the
spread (the profit that the pharmacy receives), led to court cases in the U.S.”); Drug Pricing
and Reimbursement 101: RJ Health—Methodologies & Drug Claims—AWP, WAC, ASP,
APC Explained, RJ HEALTH, https://rjhealth.com/2019/07/31/drug-pricing-101-reimbursement-rj-health-methodologies-drug-claims-code-level-unit-level-hcpcs-ndc/
[https://perma.cc/SUG7-J7NY] (describing how each kind of drug pricing is determined, frequently with built-in markups).
146
See e.g., Gencarelli, supra note 41, at 4–8.
147
HHS OIG REPORT, supra note 39, at 3.
148
Id. at 1.
149
To visualize where PSAOs and GPOs stand in relation to the larger supply chain, see
Oliver, supra note 4; see also supra text and chart accompanying note 5. Other “hidden”
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facilitate competition by helping smaller, independent pharmacies and hospitals
compete against their consolidated peers,150 they also burden the system with
another intermediary layer, further complicating the pathway of pharmaceuticals.151
PSAOs have developed to assist pharmacies—particularly smaller, independent pharmacies—as they negotiate contracts with PBMs and health plans.152 The
emergence of PSAOs represents a response to the extensive and convoluted
agreements that underpin pharmacies’ business with other players in the supply
chain; many independent pharmacies lack the resources or wherewithal to handle these contracts on their own.153 PSAOs, representing a cohort of many pharmacies at once, can thus empower smaller firms within a consolidated pharmacy
landscape.154
Viewed another way, however, PSAOs exemplify how complexity in a system begets additional complexity. The demand for PSAO services, after all, is a
reaction to the powerful inscrutability of PBMs, another intermediary in the supply chain.155 Moreover, although supportive of smaller firms, PSAOs may also
help entrench other consolidated intermediaries: 75% of independent
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agents operate discreetly in the supply chain, including rebate aggregators & pharmacy brokers. Like other intermediaries in the supply chain, PSAOs primarily operate under a veil of
secrecy, although some states recently passed state laws intended to bolster reporting requirements. See, e.g., H.B. 978, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020); see also PHARM. CARE MGMT.
ASS’N, PHARMACY SERVICES ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (PSAOS) AND THEIR LITTLEKNOWN CONNECTIONS TO INDEPENDENT PHARMACIES 10 (2021) [hereinafter LITTLE-KNOWN
CONNECTIONS] (other states like West Virginia and Wisconsin have also considered measures
requiring PSAOs to report pharmacies they contract with—along with their fee structures).
150
See GAO PSAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 22 (describing how PSAOs create efficiencies for independent pharmacies).
151
But see id. at 23 (noting that PSAOs generally charge monthly fee to members for their
services, which may avoid some of spread pricing concerns that plague PBM or GPO sectors).
See supra Section IV, Part A (describing how PBM compensation structure may motivate
PBMs to pursue higher drug prices).
152
See generally GAO PSAO REPORT, supra note 23; see also LITTLE-KNOWN
CONNECTIONS, supra note 149, at 8 (noting that 83% of independent pharmacies are represented by PSAO as of 2019—marginal increase from 80% described in 2012 GAO Report).
153
GAO PSAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 15–16.
154
See Patrick M. Kelly, Matthew J. DiLoreto & Elyse Petroni, Pharmacy Services Administrative Organizations (PSAOs), HEALTHCARE DISTRIBUTION ALL., https://www.hda.org/issues/pharmacy-services-administrative-organizations [https://perma.cc/TKW8-HSFL] (noting that independent pharmacies comprise about 35% of U.S. pharmacy market); see also
Fein, Pharmacies, supra note 13 (reporting collective market share of independent pharmacies pales compared to that of three largest pharmacy chains, which together account for more
than half of market).
155
See GAO PSAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 15–16 (“Independent pharmacies generally
lack the legal expertise and time to adequately review and negotiate third-party payer or PBM
contracts, which can be lengthy and complex.”).
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pharmacies use PSAOs that are owned by the three dominant wholesale distributors.156 Wholesale distributors can leverage their PSAO services to not only
retain their pharmacy clients, but also benefit their distribution business by increasing the drug volume that an independent pharmacy requires as an outcome
of their negotiated PBM contract.157 In this way, PSAOs and wholesale distributors may mutually reinforce one another’s market position, helping to solidify
the complexity of the system.
Group purchasing organizations (GPOs) occupy an analogous niche between
independent pharmacies or hospital clinics and wholesale distributors. A GPO,
like a PSAO, bands together many individual actors—small pharmacies, in addition to hospitals and health clinics—to obtain drugs from wholesalers at a discounted rate.158 The first GPO—a group of New York hospitals—formed in
1910;159 there are now more than 600 organizations of this kind, although the
GPO market for prescription drugs is dominated by an increasingly consolidated
few.160
Spurring the rise of GPOs was first the inception of Medicare and Medicaid,161 and then, in 1986, the passage of a “safe harbor” provision to the AntiKickback Statute clarifying that GPOs could receive administrative fees from
suppliers.162 A 2012 Government Accountability Office study found, consequently, that large GPOs are funded almost entirely by supplier or vendor fees,
which are determined by applying a percentage—ranging from less than one
percent to more than three percent for generic prescription drugs—to the
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156
See LITTLE-KNOWN CONNECTIONS, supra note 149, at 1 (noting that Cardinal Health,
AmerisourceBergen, and McKesson own PSAOs used by vast majority of independent pharmacies).
157
See GAO PSAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 27.
158
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-13, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS: FUNDING STRUCTURE HAS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICARE COSTS
(2014) [hereinafter GAO GPO REPORT] (discussing how GPOs help pharmacies and
healthcare providers purchase medical devices and services, in addition to prescription drugs);
see generally DAN O’BRIEN, JON LEIBOWITZ & RUSSELL ANELLO, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS: HOW GPOS REDUCE HEALTHCARE COSTS AND WHY CHANGING THEIR
FUNDING MECHANISM WOULD RAISE COSTS (2017) (funded by Healthcare Supply Chain Association (HSCA) trade & lobbying group that advocates for GPOs).
159
The Evolution of Group Purchasing Organizations, DRUG TOPICS (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.drugtopics.com/view/evolution-group-purchasing-organizations
[https://perma.cc/GGA3-CT7E].
160
See GAO GPO REPORT, supra note 158, at 5.
161
See DRUG TOPICS, supra note 159 (following the launch of Medicare and Medicaid, the
number of GPOs grew to around forty by 1974).
162
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(C) (1986);
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(j) (1991); see GAO GPO REPORT, supra note 158, at 6–7 (clarifying
1991 HHS qualification requirements for GPOs to qualify for safe harbor); see also O’BRIEN,
supra note 158, at 5 (noting that no previous court found that vendor fees paid to GPOs constituted kickback).
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negotiated price of a given product.163 Although proponents of GPOs tout their
ability to reduce supply and transaction costs for their members,164 their feebased compensation structure, like that of PBMs,165 may act to discourage GPOs
from fighting for lower prices.166 Pharmacies or small clinics that choose to go
it alone, however, may not be able to marshal sufficient volume to deal attractively with wholesaler distributors.167
To keep afloat in the flood of paperwork and contracts that is the prescription
drug supply chain, independent pharmacies have increasingly turned to PSAOs
and GPOs. However, the consequent growth of PSAOs and GPOs has ironically
saddled the supply chain with another layer of transactions and negotiations, requiring drugs to pass through more hands—and empty more pockets—before
reaching patients. Patterns of horizontal168 and vertical169 consolidation, meanwhile, empower intermediary firms to remain entrenched between drug companies and payors. In other words, we should not expect these hidden brokers to
truly disappear.
Concentration at various levels of the industry also discourages disruption of
the supply chain as a whole. Only three major PBMs control most of the market.170 As noted above, the wholesale distributor level also exhibits a high level
163

GAO GPO REPORT, supra note 158, at 16.
See e.g., O’BRIEN, supra note 158, at 3 (asserting that GPOs improve competition for
healthcare procurement and lower prices for patients).
165
See supra text accompanying notes 104–107 (describing how PBM compensation structure fuels higher prices); see also HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 18–21; Feldman, Perverse
Incentives, supra note 20.
166
GPOs are paid mainly by the suppliers with whom they contract, not the hospitals and
pharmacies on whose behalf they contract, which may lessen the incentive to negotiate lower
prices. Lower prices translate to lower vendor fees. See FTC Workshop Slides, supra note 14,
at 169; cf. Robert E. Litan, Hal J. Singer & Anna Birkenbach, An Empirical Analysis of Aftermarket Transactions by Hospitals, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 23 (2011) (finding that hospitals saved 10–14% when using purchasing agent not compensated by its suppliers).
167
See Britt, supra note 12 (describing anecdotal accounts of independent pharmacies and
small medical clinics cut off by major wholesalers for failing to meet minimum purchasing
thresholds, forcing them to purchase from other pharmacies at significant markup).
168
Pharmacies, PBMs, and wholesale distributors all exhibit remarkable horizontal consolidation, with the top three firms in each sector commanding more than 50%, 85% and 95% of
their respective markets. See Fein, Pharmacies, supra note 13 (calculating 2020 pharmacy
market); HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 14 (describing PBM market share in commercial
insurance space); Fein, Wholesalers, supra note 12 (calculating 2019 wholesale distribution
market).
169
Several healthcare giants transcend one niche of the pharmaceutical supply chain, as
increased vertical integration enables firms like Cardinal Health to capture revenue at every
stage from contract manufacturing to pharmacy services administration. See supra text accompanying notes 29–37.
170
The three largest PBMs control 85% of the commercial insurance market. See
HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 14.
164
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of concentration, with three large players dominating the industry.171 This encourages conscious parallelism, in which companies that should be competing
with one another offer similar prices and terms, often moving in lockstep.172
Conscious parallelism is not illegal,173 but it is undesirable from society’s perspective. When everyone moves together, no one competes, and the result is a
massive monolith of an industry, rather than one full of nimble, varied, and creative competitors.
Competitive opportunities are further weakened by those who play more than
one role on the field—for example, a PBM running a chain pharmacy or an insurance company running a mail-order pharmacy. Vertically combined functions, in the proper circumstances, can provide opportunities to block competition. Although a half-century ago, the conservative Chicago School of Law and
Economics posited that firms cannot extract additional monopoly rents through
vertical integration, post-Chicago scholarship has demonstrated that such a strategy can be effective, particularly as a method of monopoly maintenance in the
face of disruptive technologies.174
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171
95% of all prescription drugs move through the three largest wholesale distributors. See
Fein, Wholesalers, supra note 12.
172
See HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 102 & 174–175 n.57 (describing how major PBMs
can tacitly coordinate contract terms and pricing by using services of PBM consultants, who
share access to same databases of drug prices and formulary costs); 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1402 (3d ed. 2010) (describing hub-and-spoke conspiracies, in which middle player can facilitate collusion between market competitors without
direct communication between competitors to each other); see generally U.S. v. Apple, Inc.,
791 F.3d 290 (2d. Cir. 2015) (ruling against Apple and e-book publishers where Apple served
as hub for the publishers).
173
See, e.g., Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993) (“Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market
might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence
with respect to price and output decisions.”); Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 873 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Even though such interdependence or ‘conscious parallelism’ harms consumers just as a monopoly does, it is beyond the reach of antitrust
laws[.]”).
174
See, e.g., Feldman, Defensive Leveraging, supra note 118, at 2085 (challenging onemonopoly-profit rule); Hans-Theo Normann, Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and
Upstream Collusion 10–11 (Max Planck Inst. for Rsch. on Collective Goods, Working Paper
No. 2008/30, 2008) (finding that equilibrium needed to sustain joint-profit maximum of certain colluding firms is unambiguously lower with vertical integration than that needed for
collusion in separated industry); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical
Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 513, 515 (1995) (explaining that
post-Chicago theorists, employing newer methodologies of modern industrial organization,
have identified circumstances in which vertical mergers and vertical restraints can raise significant competitive concerns). U.S. competition agency views on the topic, particularly
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In short, there must be a better way to run a railroad. The myriad twists and
turns of the pharmaceutical supply chain, combined with high levels of concentration at various levels, ensure that patients and payors will be burdened by
excessive costs. The results are visible in the soaring costs of prescription medication, particularly in comparison to the same drugs across time and in other
industrialized nations.175
V. FROM HERE TO THERE
Trees grow in strange and twisted ways to adapt to the environment. Branches
will bend and weave to reach the open sun; trunks will embed themselves in
chain-link fencing; roots will spread to a neighboring yard when a swimming
pool blocks their path. And so it is with the pharmaceutical supply system. The
system has sprouted in winding ways as participants try to avoid obstacles and
reach for additional nourishment. The result, however, is not necessary, nor is it
inevitable.
Even operating within current constraints, one could imagine and design effective disruptions to the system. The ingredients could include a direct pipeline,
storage, and delivery components, and perhaps a dash of regulatory nourishment. And where is the best place for such a new system to sprout? An excellent
location would be in the laboratories of democracy themselves: the states.
As Justice Brandeis explained in a legendary dissent: “[i]t is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”176 A state’s right to engage in this
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related to a vertical merger’s capacity to raise rivals’ costs, have evolved over time from a
Chicago-School perspective to a post-Chicago perspective. Compare Malcolm Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Exclusion, Collusion, and Confusion: The Limits of Raising Rivals Cost (Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 179, 1990) (George H.W. Bush Administration publication asserting that “while ‘Raising Rivals Costs’ is a theoretically valid
method of achieving an anticompetitive effect on price, its practical uses are extremely limited”) with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 4
(2020) (Trump Administration publication asserting that “[a] vertical merger may diminish
competition by allowing the merged firm to profitably use its control of the related product to
weaken or remove the competitive constraint from one or more of its actual or potential rivals
in the relevant market”).
175
Wineinger, supra note 50 (describing increase in brand-name prescription drug prices
since 2012); Mulcahy, supra note 48 (finding that brand-name prescription drugs in U.S. cost
over triple their average cost in 32 other OECD countries).
176
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
phrase “laboratories of democracy” has become ubiquitous in describing the role of the states,
from academic works to federal government sources. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, State
and Local Governments: Laboratories of Democracy, AMERICA.GOV (Dec. 16, 2007),
https://web.archive.org/web/20091113070938/http://www.america.gov/st/pubs-english/2007/December/20071216153045esnamfuak0.6855432.html [https://perma.cc/FTH2-
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experimentation flows from the Tenth Amendment’s decree that powers which
the Constitution does not delegate to the federal government or prohibit to the
states are reserved to the states or to the people.177 Those powers reserved to the
states are described by the vague and amorphous term “police powers,”178
through which a state may protect the general welfare of its citizens,179 even if
the definition of the welfare of the state’s citizens might differ from the definition its next door neighbor derives for its own citizens. A state’s core police
powers include the ability to regulate health and safety for its citizens.180 Moreover, in modern context, the notion of a state’s police powers has expanded to
broadly include economic issues, rather than only health, safety, and morals.181
Thus, the states are well equipped to experiment with different approaches to
the pharmaceutical supply system, depending on the necessary business and legal environments. A state with a large population might have the volume flow
to make such an experiment attractive to the necessary players—and, of course,
the goal would be to drastically reduce the number of players, along with the
concomitant monetary leakage.
Within this construct, a closed environment such as a state penal system provides a potential environment for a pilot program. Such a system would be accustomed to sourcing a wide variety of medications and could have the capacity
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3ADB]; G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific
Management, 31 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 37 (2001) (describing Brandeis’ metaphor but arguing that it would be better to abandon it).
177
See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
178
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“An attempt to define [the police
power’s] reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.
The definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition.”); 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 693 n.1 (1895) (“Discussions of what is called the ‘police power’ are often uninstructive . . . .”); see also Reuel E.
Schiller, Regulation’s Hidden History, 25 REVS. AM. HIST. 416, 418 (1997) (describing shifts
in contours of state’s police powers and noting that in 19th century, “the police power was
above even the Constitution. Individual rights bowed before it. In a well-regulated society,
personal property and liberty existed only to the extent that they did not interfere with the felt
necessities of public power”).
179
See, e.g., Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347–348 (1880) (defining “police powers
of the states” as “those powers by which the health, good order, peace, and general welfare of
the community are promoted”).
180
See, e.g., City of Hillsborough v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985)
(explaining that statutes regulating health and safety are part of state’s general police power);
Webber, 103 U.S. at 348 (listing health as within state’s police powers).
181
See Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 J. CONST. L.
745, 792–93 (2007) (noting that history of notion of police power from 16th century onward
and describing Supreme Court’s repudiation of Lochner-era restrictions on state’s ability to
regulate in economic sphere).

43623-bst_28-1 Sheet No. 22 Side B

 

36

 

02/22/2022 11:40:34

 









B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.

 

[Vol. 28:1

C M
Y K

02/22/2022 11:40:34

182
See, e.g., Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Pt. II: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 15 (2019) (statement of Olivier Brandicourt, CEO, SanofiAventis U.S., LLC) (“I appreciate the confusion as to why patient costs continue to rise, even
when the amount that PBMs and health plans pay declines. This situation is unacceptable and
unsustainable for too many patients.”); Zirkelbach, supra note 53 (PhRMA blog post highlighting the increase in PBM revenue).
183
See Legarre, supra note 181.

43623-bst_28-1 Sheet No. 22 Side B

to handle storage and inventory. Each of these components would be essential
in establishing an effective structure, and thereby convincing other public, and
even private, health systems that disruption is possible. I will refer to the program as the “state pilot.”
The state pilot would negotiate directly with drug companies for the purchase
of medications. Drug companies have complained mightily, in forums ranging
from Congressional hearings to press notices, about the profits that are siphoned
out of the healthcare system by the PBM intermediaries.182 Thus, one could expect that drug companies would view these direct pathways as a useful opportunity, both from a profit and public relations standpoint.
Initiating the program would not require waiting until all drug companies
agree to participate. Starting with a few large players, or even one, could be
enough to begin breaking the system. As with the entire notion of starting with
a demonstration project, getting the camel’s nose under the tent can be very effective in toppling a structure.
Although not essential for the state pilot, one could imagine replacing wholesale distributors as well as PBMs. Other private delivery services, including Amazon, FedEx, UPS, etc., might provide effective alternatives, thereby injecting
competition at the wholesale distributor level of the supply chain.
Providing an environment where the state pilot could flourish would require
certain legal changes at the state level. Conversations with industry insiders suggest that PBMs currently use their market power to interfere with any attempt to
purchase directly from drug companies. Consider the following potential threat
from a PBM: if employers and drug companies negotiate directly with each
other, rather than going through the PBM, the PBM will claw back past rebate
amounts from the employer and retaliate against the drug company by placing
the company’s drugs on less favorable formulary tiers on other health plans
throughout the state.
States have the power to dampen these threats. As noted above, states can
regulate commercial behavior within their own borders in the interests of the
health and welfare of their citizens.183 Thus, a state could pass legislation providing that any business practice that forbids or discourages companies from interacting with the state pilot is void as a matter of being against public policy.
Moreover, the statute could provide that if PBMs retaliate through other contracts in the state, the drug company has a cause of action under state law to
recover the consequent business losses. The goal would be to forbid commercial
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behaviors that are not in the public interest as drug companies and other intermediaries seek to prevent improvements in the healthcare supply chain.
Even without legislation, state courts could determine that these PBM practices violate state antitrust law as anticompetitive, state tort law as an interference with a prospective business relationship, or state consumer protection
laws—depending on the practice.184 Once again, the language is chosen to begin
in a narrow fashion, although the state could easily choose to craft the legislation
as applying more broadly to other health plans within the state.
If state pilot programs such as these were successfully implemented, additional steps could help ensure that similar systems did not emerge. Ideally, one
would want to confirm that pharmaceutical companies could not shift the current
practice of providing rebates and side payments to PBMs (in exchange for disadvantaging competitors) to a new practice of providing those payments to insurers. Insurers should have greater incentives to resist such an approach, but
other work has noted the potential for a confluence of incentives that could
prompt insurers and drug companies to act outside the interests of consumers
and competition.185 And, of course, no state pilot program such as this could
solve all aspects of the problems plaguing modern pharmaceutical markets. For
example, even going directly from here to there and eliminating all of the monetary leakage in the system would not solve the problem of trying to finance
expensive new specialty drugs that launch at an annual cost of seven figures.186
Nevertheless, unwinding the twisted pathways of the pharmaceutical industry
would go a long way in reducing the costs to patients and payors alike.
CONCLUSION
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184
Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1599–1600
(2015) (describing state efforts to prosecute patent trolling with existing consumer protection
and deceptive trade practices statutes); Pennsylvania v. Tap Pharm. Prod., Inc., 415 F. Supp.
2d 516 (E.D. Pa. 2005); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d
20 (D. Mass. 20074).
185
For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see HANDSHAKES, supra note 18, at 32–44,
93–95.
186
The two most expensive specialty drugs—Zolgensma & Zokinvy—command list prices
of more than one million dollars for an annual treatment course. Many others near the same
mark. See Hannah McQueen, The 10 Most Expensive Drugs in the U.S., Period, GOODRX
(Sept. 7, 2021, 2:38 PM), https://www.goodrx.com/blog/most-expensive-drugs-period/
[https://perma.cc/9UM7-TJ95].
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The ostensibly simple task of moving a prescription drug from manufacturer
to medicine cabinet has steadily devolved into a morass of intermediaries and
contract negotiations, with every step incurring an additional transaction. Payers
have suffered rising drug prices during this period, but the complexity has, for
others, bred opportunity. Intermediaries comfortably populate the many niches
that have emerged throughout the supply chain. With more mouths to feed, the
eventual cost to consumers and payors continues to mount.
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Ossified and highly profitable, the pharmaceutical supply chain has little incentive to simplify itself; rather, several factors help perpetuate its convoluted
status quo. Many of these firms operate in the recesses of the pharmaceutical
landscape, largely exempt from disclosure requirements or regulatory scrutiny.
Other intermediary firms have entrenched themselves through extensive consolidation, owning formidable market power, and lobbying clout as a result. Instead
of stumbling around this labyrinth, it is time to cut a straighter path. Enabling
states and other large payors to source drugs directly from manufacturers would
disrupt the expensive and elaborate rituals that have developed in the space between them. A disruptive alternative does not need to be a destructive one. A
low-stakes pilot program at the state level can offer a model for states and other
payers to take on price negotiation and inventory responsibilities without compromising patient access to medication. Other solutions may also suffice, such
as leveraging existing shipping channels to transport drugs more efficiently. In
any case, without a simpler set of directions to follow, society will have no
choice but to continue enduring expensive detours.
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